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Resumen. Este artículo presenta un análisis territorial de las cooperativas desglosado a nivel de Comunidades 
Autónomas (CCAA). Tres son los principales objetivos. En primer lugar, investigar si el ciclo del empleo de las 
cooperativas muestra una relación diferente con respecto al ciclo económico dependiendo de la localización regional de 
las cooperativas. En segundo lugar, evaluar si cuanto mayor es la tradición cooperativa de la CCAA, mayor es el 
desacoplamiento entre el ciclo económico y las fases cíclicas de las cooperativas. Por último, descubrir si, dentro de las 
diferentes CCAA, las cooperativas que sobrevivieron a la crisis de 2008 comparten algunos patrones comunes. Nuestros 
resultados muestran que (1) más del 50% de las CCAA logran un grado medio de relación pro-cíclica y que solo un 
pequeño grupo de ellas presenta una relación contra-cíclica; (2) el empleo de las cooperativas exhibe un cierto grado de 
resiliencia; y (3) las cooperativas que sobrevivieron a la crisis eran empresas maduras, de pequeño tamaño, con índices 
financieros adecuados, pero con un margen de beneficio negativo.  
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[en] Cooperative employment cycles in Spain. Does regional localization matter? 
Abstract. This paper presents a territorial analysis of the cooperatives within various Spanish regions. The purpose is 
threefold. The first objective is to investigate whether the cooperatives’ employment cycle shows a different 
relationship regarding the business cycle and whether this depends on the regional localization of the cooperatives. The 
second is to evaluate whether the greater the cooperative tradition, the greater the decoupling between business cycle 
and cooperatives’ cyclical phases. The third objective is to find out if, within the different Spanish regions, those 
cooperatives that survived the 2008 crisis share some common patterns. Our results show that (1) more than 50% of the 
regions achieve a medium degree of a pro-cyclical relationship and that only a small group of regions presents a 
counter-cyclical relationship; (2) the cooperatives' employment exhibits a certain degree of resilience; and (3) the 
cooperatives that survived the crisis were mature, small-sized firms with adequate financial ratios but with a negative 
profit margin. 
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1. Introduction 
Spain has a long tradition with regard to cooperatives. They remain an important economic engine which 
derives not so much from their contribution to the Spanish macroeconomic data (they account for roughly 
0.6% of the added value, and generate, in average, a bit more than 1% of employment) but because they 
represent a new organizational model whose goals go further towards maximizing profits. The cooperatives 
attempt as much as possible to satisfy the needs of their members and align their purposes with those of the 
business (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009; Carini and Carpita, 2014). 
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We can find a great amount of literature that stresses the higher resilience of the cooperatives rather than 
capitalist companies, particularly in times of crisis. Various pieces of scholarship, such as the work of 
Basterretxea and Storey (2018); Fusco and Migliaccio (2018); Musson and Rousselière (2018), review 
several studies that confirm that employee ownership yields positive effects in terms of satisfaction and 
motivation, which would improve productivity and commitment.4 In the face of economic shocks, employees 
are more accepting towards changes in their work conditions, and more willing to find ways to reduce costs 
and to enhance their relationship with their customers. These measures would be necessary to increase 
cooperatives’ chances of survival and to maintain their employment levels. 
The greater flexibility of cooperatives to adjust via hours worked rather than number of workers confers 
greater labour stability and, together with elements such as gender equality, non-discrimination and 
inclusion, increases the quality of employment  (Calderón and Calderón, 2012; Roelants, Dovgan, Eum and 
Terrasi, 2012). The larger stability in the work facilitates investment in human capital and the improvement 
of the skills of the workers, which in turn leads to good results of the company (Park, Kruse, and Sesil, 
2004). On the other hand, it is observed that their decision-making strategies are more likely to introduce 
opportunities for the incorporation of employment input and to seek a balance between human capital and 
business opportunities (Lampel, Bhalla, and Jha, 2014). Cooperatives are more selective at the time of hiring 
and more reluctant at the time of firing, which reduces the incentive to expand operations simply to take 
advantage of the opportunities of the expansive phases, but also makes them less vulnerable to contractions 
(Díaz and Marcuello, 2010; Lampel, Bhalla, and Jha, 2012; Román, 2014). These facts could confirm the 
existence of counter-cyclical behaviour of the cooperatives’ employment with respect to the business cycle.5 
In relation to this, there are two important fields that deserve to be analysed. Firstly, there is a large 
consensus about the fact that cooperatives’ employment resilience differs according to their geographic 
location (Borda-Rodríguez, Johnson, Shaw and Vicari, 2016; Costa and Carini, 2016; Fakhfakh, Perotin, and 
Gago, 2012; Musson and Rousselière, 2018; Soboh, Lansink, and Van Dijk, 2014). In this sense, some 
papers suggest that the resilience of the cooperatives is better than other companies’ models in territories 
with a long cooperative tradition, such as Spain (Díaz-Foncea and Marcuello, 2015; Roelants et al., 2012).  
Secondly, studies such as those by Cantanero, González-Loureiro, and Puig (2017), Musson and 
Rousselière (2018), Sala-Ríos, Torres-Solé, and Farré-Perdiguer (2018), and Sala Rios, Torres Solé, and 
Farré Perdiguer (2015) demonstrate that the 2008 crisis increased the pro-cyclical link between cooperatives' 
employment and the business cycle. The intensity of the crisis and its systemic character undermined the 
reasons that position cooperative employment as better able to deal with downturns. 
This paper is related to both fields and has three main objectives. The first is to investigate if 
cooperatives’ employment cycles demonstrate different relationships with respect to the business cycle 
depending on the regional localization of cooperatives. The second is to analyse whether the greater the 
cooperative tradition, hereafter referred to as “cooperative culture”, the greater the decoupling between 
business cycle and cooperatives’ cyclical phases. Finally, if, as the literature states, the 2008 crisis implied 
that cooperatives became more sensitive to the business cycle, we want to analyse what factors helped 
cooperatives to survive. The objective is to find out if in the different Spanish regions, those cooperatives 
that survived show common patterns in their economic, financial, internal and locational features. 
These objectives will allow to draw conclusions on how the greater cooperative tradition of a region 
could explain the greater or lower degree of synchronization between the cooperatives' employment cyclical 
phases and the business cycle. Likewise, since the crisis of 2008 is within the analysis period and, according 
to Sala Rios et al. (2015), the cooperatives' employment succumbed to its depth,  the regional cyclical phases 
that we will identify, will enable to analyse the  degree of idiosyncrasy or homogeneity showed among 
regions in this crisis period.  
We contribute to the existing literature by supplying an accurate overhaul of the Spanish cooperatives at 
the regional level that has not yet been performed. We introduce territoriality as a determinant factor of the 
analysis. We also add different knowledge to the existing literature. First, we are going to deduce whether 
different cyclical behaviours exist depending on the regional cooperatives’ localization. Second, we are 
going to find out the extent to which the long Spanish cooperative tradition matters to achieving a counter-
cyclical behaviour. Third, we adopt the cluster analysis method to infer clusters that define the regional 
homogeneities and divergences relating to the cooperatives that survived the profoundest recession within 
our period of study. 
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Sala-Ríos, M.; Farré-Perdiguer, M.; Torres-Solé, T. Revesco (136) 2020: 1-25 3 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a descriptive analysis of Spanish cooperatives. 
Section 3 describes the data used and the study methodology. Section 4 presents the results. We conclude in 
section 5. 
2. Cooperatives descriptive analysis  
The Spanish economy’s long cooperative tradition dates back to the guilds of merchants that sought to 
support and help each other protect themselves. In the mid-19th century, cooperatives were established 
throughout the Spanish territory. In the early 1930s the first statistics show that more than 500 cooperatives 
were created. In those years, the creation and expansion of agricultural cooperatives was linked to the 
influence of the Catholic cooperative movement. However, the arrival of the regime of Franco meant that 
cooperatives were under guardianship and were used as instruments of economic and social policy, 
especially agricultural ones. The 1950s saw a revival of cooperatives; the importance of these years is due in 
part to the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation, nowadays one of the largest and most successful 
cooperative groups in the world (Bretos, Errasti, and Marcuello, 2018), which began its activity in the País 
Vasco region. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the cooperative sector increased in importance, but they were still 
largely associated with the agricultural sector because cooperatives were not seen as a possible axis of 
industrial development (Díaz-Foncea and Marcuello, 2013; Morales, 2003). In those years, three regions 
stand out for having a concentration of more than 50% of the number of active cooperatives: these are 
Andalucía, Cataluña, and C. Valencia  (Morales, 2003). The development of cooperatives in some regions 
was linked to the lack of a business model which undermined the capacity to develop business activity. The 
creation of cooperatives was seen as a way to industrialize the countryside without having to contribute large 
amounts of capital and with minimal risk. Regions such as Murcia or Castilla la Mancha are an example of 
this, which were especially focused on winegrowing cooperatives. 
Over time, the number of cooperatives and the activities in which they were active expanded. In the early 
eighties, the growth of the European cooperative movement and measures of legislative and financial support 
granted cooperatives a significant role in the fight against unemployment. Morales (2003) distinguishes 
between three great cooperative models. The first were cooperatives that emerged from failed companies, 
especially in urban areas (phoenix bird). The second acted as subsidiary adjustment mechanisms to adapt 
capitalist companies to the economic situation (induced cooperatives). Finally, there were cooperatives that 
were created as the only option for depressed rural areas (symbolic cooperatives). In the mid-1980s, the 
European Union supposed the expansion of markets, reducing their relevance. The incorporation of Spain 
into the EEC had different sectorial impacts but, in general, agricultural cooperatives with greater exporting 
aptitude were those which adapted more quickly to European regulations (Román, 2014). 
In the early 1990s, the economic downturn, legislative adjustment at the regional level, and a high 
dependence on government aid brought about a new increase in the number of cooperatives. In contrast, the 
economic expansion between 2000 and 2007 relegated the cooperative movement to the background. The 
2008 crisis, which created millions of unemployed and growing social needs, brought cooperatives into the 
spotlight once again as an alternative to capitalist companies (Divar Garteiz-Aurrecoa, 2013). This evolution 
agrees with the fact that the creation of cooperatives is counter-cyclical; however, Pérotin (2006) points out 
that this behaviour is not so clear for the exit. Ben-Ner (1988) indicates that the counter-cyclical pattern 
exists despite being partially offset by the fact that cooperatives are also created in expansive phases and 
their survival could be vulnerable to contractions. There is no doubt that the issue deserves attention. In this 
sense, this study addresses the relationship between cooperatives and business cycles in Spain at the stage of 
expansion and subsequent crisis (2003–2019); the study’s novelty is that we do so at the regional level. In 
order to improve the contextualization of the results and before dealing with the main objectives of the study, 
we present the main data of the cooperatives at the regional level. 
Throughout the period 2003–2019, the variables that we examine present those fluctuations typical of a 
period of this length; however, they maintain the trend. It is for this reason, and to take into account the 2008 
crisis (which is subject of study in this paper), that we present the data corresponding to a pre-crisis year 
(2005), a crisis year (2009), and a post-crisis year (2014). We begin the analysis with a general perspective 
based on the information provided by the average of these three years. 
Table 1 shows that Andalucía and Cataluña provide roughly 40% of the number of cooperatives and 
added value (AV). These two regions plus C. Valencia comprise 54% of the workers. According to the data 
(average) of Table A1.1 in Appendix 1, Castilla y León has the lowest ratio of workers per cooperative (6) 
which implies small-sized cooperatives. By contrast, the highest ratio is obtained by C. Valencia (21). The 
figures from Navarra and País Vasco (20) also stand out – in País Vasco this is due to the idiosyncrasy 
granted by the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation. 
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Table. 1. Percentage weight of each region of total Spain1 
 Cooperatives2 Sales figures Added value (AV) Employment 
 Andalucía  25.76 25.17 21.93 22.31 
 Aragón  3.45 4.17 2.96 2.43 
 Asturias  1.53 1.46 1.14 1.24 
 Baleares  0.86 0.80 0.88 0.88 
 Canarias  1.98 2.89 2.25 2.43 
 Cantabria  0.56 0.46 0.39 0.50 
 Castilla la Mancha  6.47 5.28 4.82 4.43 
 Castilla y León   7.15 6.29 5.26 3.90 
 Cataluña  14.10 12.74 20.87 12.96 
 C. Valencia  10.66 11.30 16.96 19.03 
 Extremadura  4.02 4.45 3.08 2.48 
 Galicia  4.50 6.17 4.35 3.07 
 C. Madrid  5.26 11.76 7.54 5.65 
 C. Murcia  6.14 6.38 6.84 6.49 
 Navarra3  1.30 
  2.13 
 País Vasco3  5.53 
  9.50 
 La Rioja   0.73 0.70 0.72 0.57 
1. 2005-2009-2014 average 
2. Number of quotation centres 
3. The fiscal data of País Vasco and Navarra are excluded because they have a special regional regime that allows them to have an 
independent Spanish Tax Agency, so it is not possible to obtain their fiscal figures. 
Source: Ministry Labour and Social Economy (MLSE) and own elaboration 
Table A1.2 in Appendix 1 shows that, by economic sector, Andalucía and Castilla y León account for 
over 50% of the total primary sector cooperatives, while Andalucía, C. Valencia, and Murcia together have 
almost 80% of the employment. Related to other sectors, Andalucía and Cataluña show, in general, the 
greatest weight over the total, both for establishments and employment. It should be noted, however, that the 
industrial employment of País Vasco is attributable to the presence of Mondragon. 
If we analyse the weight of each sector over the total of the region (Table A1.3 in Appendix 1), we can 
see that Castilla y León stands out in number of primary sector cooperatives, representing 41.31% of  total, 
percentage that, for the Spanish economy as a whole is, approximately, 14%. La Rioja and Castilla la 
Mancha, with percentages of 42.03% and 37.20%, respectively, are well above the industry average of the 
Spanish economy as a whole (20%). Murcia juts out in construction (16.27%) and Baleares and Madrid in 
services (83.84% and 81.59%).  
Regarding employment, Murcia and C. Valencia stand out above the total of the Spanish economy in the 
primary sector (33.28% and 29.28%), Navarra and La Rioja in industry (34.14% and 32.69%), Extremadura 
and Murcia in construction (8.17% and 6.86%), and, finally, Baleares and Madrid in the services sector 
(92.59% and 91.15% ). Although the cooperative movement does not take a leading role in these two 
regions, a certain ideological dimension linked to cooperative values is observed (Sabín, Fernández and 
Bandrés, 2013), which has led to the birth of cooperatives focused mainly on the service sector. This is 
because, on the one hand, Madrid has an important presence of administration and services and, on the other 
hand, because Baleares is a major tourist destination which requires a large number of service companies. 
In the rest of the regions, we find a mismatch between the weight of the number of cooperatives and that 
of the workers. When centres stand out above the workers, this mismatch implies the existence of a high 
number of small cooperatives. This is especially significant in the Castilla y León primary sector and in the 
C. Valencia industry sector. In contrast, when workers stand out above the centres, this mismatch implies a 
larger average dimension of cooperatives. This would be the case for the service sector in most regions. 
The analysis above conforms to the study by Pérez and Valiente (2017) which points out  cooperatives’ 
sectorial and regional diversity. As the authors state, major homogeneity is found in the services sector, even 
though it is not possible to argue that a behaviour-only pattern exists. 
Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 shows the effects of the 2008 crisis. In 2014, there were more than 5,000 
cooperatives and almost 24,000 workers less than when compared with 2005. Andalucía and Cataluña, two 
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regions with strong cooperative roots, were the ones where the number of establishments dropped the most 
(1,896 and 1,125, respectively). Employment fell more generally among the regions, although it should be 
emphasized that in Andalucía the number of workers decreased by more than 8,000, and in C. Valencia the 
number of workers decreased by more than 5,000. Catalonia was the region that lost the most sales and AV, 
which is an even more remarkable fact because in 2014 many regions had already recovered their pre-crisis 
values. The data of Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 shows that employment and establishments were the variables 
most sensitive to the crisis; in contrast, sales and AV better resisted the onslaught of the crisis. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
Throughout the study, the territorial breakdown used is the hierarchy of two NUTS levels established by 
Eurostat (NUTS-2), which means that we work with 17 Spanish regions: Andalucía; Aragón; Asturias; 
Baleares; Canarias; Cantabria; Castilla la Mancha; Castilla y León; Cataluña; C. Valencia; Extremadura; 
Galicia; C. Madrid; C. Murcia; Navarra; País Vasco; and La Rioja.6 
In the fourth section, we approach the interactions between the fluctuations in cooperatives’ employment 
and the Spanish business cycle during the period of 2003-1Q through 2019-1Q. The business cycle indicator 
is GDP in real terms. The employment corresponds to cooperatives’ employees registered in the General 
Social Security Regime, and the Special Autonomous Regime is excluded. The sources of the data are the 
Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) for GDP and the Ministry Labour and Social Economy (MLSE) 
for cooperatives’ employment. Variables are at a quarterly frequency, seasonally adjusted, and in log levels. 
The analysis of cooperatives that survived the 2008 crisis works with cooperatives active in 2014 – once 
the recession was over. The information is obtained from the Iberian Balance Analysis System (SABI) 
database. The initial sample included information of 6,343 active cooperatives. We cleaned the sample by 
removing cooperatives with irregularities (for example, missing values or negative sales values). After this 
filtering, we obtained information on 4,123 cooperatives. 
3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1. First objective: The relationship between the cooperatives’ employment and business cycles 
Our first goal is to investigate whether there are significant (a-)symmetries between cooperatives’ 
regional employment cycles and the business cycle. We do so in two steps. First, we identify the cyclical 
phases of the business cycle (GDP), the Spanish cooperatives’ employment (CE) and the cooperatives’ 
regional employment (CRE). Second, we analyse the level of synchronization between the GDP and 
CE/CRE. 
Based on the pioneering work of Burns and Mitchell (1946), the cyclical phases of the business cycle can 
be identified via different approaches. Our study uses the deviation cycle approach (Lucas, 1977). The 
cyclical component is calculated as the deviation of the original series with respect to the trend using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP). The cyclical component fluctuations determine the cycle and its turning points: 
peaks (P) and troughs (T). We identify two phases in the cycle: expansion and contraction. 
Different methodologies are available to identify turning points. Our study is based on one of the most 
widely used methodologies, namely, the Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm. We work with the adaptation 
of Harding and Pagan (2002) for quarterly data. The software employed is known as BUSY, and was 
developed by the European Commission (Fiorentini and Planas, 2003). 
The number of months separating the peak and the subsequent trough (trough and peak) is defined as 
the contraction (expansion) duration. The amplitude of the expansion (contraction) approaches the gains 
(losses) of the production/employment, and it is calculated as the percentage change between the value of 
the cyclical component in the peak (trough) and the value in the previous trough (peak). 
To analyse the synchronization between business cycle and CE/CRE, we hypothesized that 
cooperatives show different relationships with respect to the business cycle depending on their regional 
localization. We perform the analysis using three different methodologies. 
The first one is the Cohen’s kappa coefficient (K). It allows us to measure the degree of agreement 
between categorical data. The formula for two raters is: 
_____________ 
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po= the relative observed agreement among raters. 
Pe = the hypothetical probability of chance agreement. 
 
We define Sit (Sjt) as a binary variable that takes the value one (1) when the cycle i (j) is in expansion, 
and zero (0) when it is in contraction. For each CRE, we calculate K between its Sit (Sjt) and the Sit (Sjt) of 
the GDP. 
The K is always less than or equal to 1. A value of 1 implies perfect agreement, and lower values imply 
less than perfect agreement. The negative value means that the agreement is less than would be expected just 
by chance. Its statistical significance does not allow us to make any affirmation about what is considered a 
high or low agreement. Then, to stablish the relative strength of synchronization associated with K, we 
follow Landis and Koch's (1977) rating scale (Table 2). 
Table. 2. Cohen's kappa coefficient (K). Degree of agreement. 
K Strength of agreement 
< 0.00 Poor (P) 
0.00 – 0.20 Slight (S) 
0.21– 0.40 Fair (F) 
0.41 – 0.60 Moderate (M) 
0.61 – 0.80 Substantial (Su) 
0.81 – 1.00 Almost perfect (AP) 
Source: Own elaboration 
The second synchronization index follows the work of Harding and Pagan (2002), who proposed this 




where Sit (Sjt) is already defined and T is the number of observations. The index varies between one 
(perfect concordance) and zero (total absence of concordance). The values of I have been split into six 
intervals following the same procedure as K (Table 3). 
Table. 3. Concordance index (I). Degree of agreement. 
I Strength of agreement 
0.00 – 0,17 Poor (P) 
0.18 – 0.33 Slight (S) 
0.34– 0.50 Fair (F) 
0.51 – 0.67 Moderate (M) 
0.68 – 0.84 Substantial (Su) 
0.85 – 1.00 Almost perfect (AP) 
Source: Own elaboration 
The main advantage of these two synchronization indicators is that they are very easy to interpret. 
Furthermore, values of I that approach zero lead us to intuit a counter-cyclical relationship. However, 
their most important disadvantage is that they do not provide information on whether the co-movements 
are statistically significant. For this reason, another synchronization methodology has to be applied. We 
follow Harding and Pagan (2006), who propose a robust test of the hypothesis that cycles are either 
unsynchronized or perfectly synchronized. By concentrating upon the relationship between two cycles, Sit 
and Sjt, the authors demonstrate that the estimation of the correlation coefficient  is a natural measure 
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of the degree of synchronization. To estimate , the authors recommend using the GMM method 




where μs is the mean and σs the standard deviation of the series Sit and Sjt. The estimator can be written as: 
 
 
In order to assess the statistical significance using the t-ratio, the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedastic 
and autocorrelation estimation procedure (HAC) with Bartlett weights is used. 
3.2.2. Second objective: the “cooperative culture”, the cooperatives’ cyclical phases and business cycle 
Our second goal is to analyse whether the greater the cooperative tradition, hereafter referred to as 
“cooperative culture”, the greater the decoupling between business cycle and cooperatives’ cyclical 
phases. To analyse it, we assimilate “cooperative culture” with significant levels of cooperatives’ 
employment in the territory and then, in order to find out the results, we classify the regions into different 
ranges of “cooperative culture” according to the following rules: 
 
1. We work with the average data for the whole period. 
2. For each region, we calculate the percentage of the total cooperatives’ employment over the total 
employment of that region (region-weight). 
3. For each region, we calculate the weight of the cooperatives’ employment over the average of the 
Spanish cooperatives’ employment (cooperatives-weight). 
 
We assume that the term “cooperative culture” comprises different aspects and that using employment as 
a proxy variable involves some weaknesses. Among these, we want to highlight, on the one hand, the fact 
that the participation of the employees in the cooperative can be carried out in different ways. They can be 
partner-worker or exclusively employees - , in the latter case, their involvement in the “cooperative culture” 
could be lower. On the other hand, there might be a certain bias in favour of regions with a greater presence 
of labour-intensive activities, such as agriculture, in which the “cooperative culture” does not necessarily 
have to be extended among the workers. Despite this, we have chosen to use employment in our analysis for 
two main reasons. The first one, since this study deals with the analysis of the cycles of cooperative 
employment in Spain, our aim is to contrast the cyclical phases of employment between the different regions 
considering the relative importance that such variable has. Secondly,  and as indicated by Díaz-Foncea and 
Marcuello (2014), in order to compare the evolution of cooperatives, the use of a stock variable, like the 
level of employment, is more appropriate than a flow variable like, for example,  the number of cooperatives. 
3.2.3. Third objective: The 2008 crisis, patterns of surviving cooperatives and regional clusters 
The cyclical phases found in the analysis of the first objective let us know the length and the depth of the 
2008 Spanish crisis, and allow us to deal with the third hypothesis of this work: in the different Spanish 
regions, those cooperatives that survived the 2008 crisis show common patterns in their economic, financial, 
internal, and locational features. 
We carried out a cluster analysis to gather the most homogeneous regions depending on the values of 
certain variables related to the active cooperatives once the recession was over. Those variables fall into one 
of these three criteria: economic-financial; cooperatives’ internal traits; and territorial. 
The variables selected are the follows: 
 
1 Group: Economic-financial criterion 
The study of the cooperatives’ performance cannot be limited to a simple consideration of traditional 
business ratios, because cooperatives have social purposes and some institutional specificities that cannot be 
overlooked. However, to ignore the profitability indicators and leave out economic or financial criteria is not 
adequate, because cooperatives have to operate to guarantee their long-term survival  (Costa, Andreaus, 
Carini and Carpita, 2012; Lajara-Camilleri and Mateos-Ronco, 2012; Lauermann,  Moreira, Souza and 
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Piccoli, 2018). The financial and economic variables have been chosen to evaluate the long-term viability of 
cooperatives. 
1.1. Liquidity ratio: (current assets-stocks)/(current liabilities) 
1.2. Debt ratio (%): [Debts/(Total assets )]*100 
1.3. Solvency ratio (%): (Shareholders funds/Total assets)*100 
1.4. Profit margin (%): (Profit before tax/turnover)*100 
 
2 Group: Internal traits criterion 
There is a wide consensus about the fact that the cooperatives’ performance differs based on activity, size 
and longevity (Borda-Rodriguez et al., 2016; Costa et al., 2012; Costa and Carini, 2016; Fakhfakh, et al. 
2012; Martínez-Victoria, Sánchez-Val, and Arcas-Lario, 2018; Musson and Rousselière, 2018; Nwankwo, 
Ogbodo, and Ewuim, 2016). We gather indicators of these three fields. 
 
2.1. Activity 
The cooperatives’ economic activities have been assigned using the statistical classification of economic 
activities in the European Community: NACE Rev. 2. 
 
2.2. Size 
To define the cooperatives’ size, we focus on the number of employees. Following the definition provided 
by the European Commission,7 we define four categories: micro, small, medium and large cooperatives 
(Table 4). 
Table. 4. Cooperatives’ size 
Category Number of Employees Categorical variable 
Micro < 10 1 
Small < 50 2 
Medium < 250 3 
Large ≥ 250 4 
Source: Own elaboration 
2.3. Longevity 
Economic literature proposes a number of ways to measure firm age.8 In this study, it is defined as the 
number of years since they began their activity until the year 2014, without considering those firms that 
began their activity in the recession phase (2008-2013). The youngest cooperatives are those created in the 
beginning of 2007, which would be eight years old. We adapt the proposition of Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (2011) and define three age groups (Table 5). 
Table. 5. Age groups 
Age groups 
Young firm (less than 12 years) 
Mid age firm (13 to 17 years) 
Mature firm (more than 17) 
Source: Own elaboration 
3 Group: Territorial criteria 
 
3.1. “Cooperative culture” 
It is necessary to include this territorial indicator in order to identify the role that the location economies 
play in the definition of the patterns of the clusters (Table 6). 
_____________ 
 
7  Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty Text with EEA relevance. 
8  See, for instance, the work of Arafat and Mohtar (2014) for a review of some measures used by the economic literature. 
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Table. 6. “Cooperative culture” 
Grade of “cooperative culture”1 Categorical variable 
High (HCC) 1 
Medium (MCC) 2 
Low (LCC) 3 
1. Classification according to the results of the analysis of cooperative culture (Table 9) 
Source: Own elaboration 
3.2. Urbanization economies 
It could be possible that the regional location played a role in the survival rates because of the effects of 
urbanization economies. The advantages of this kind of agglomeration economies derive from the urban 
location of firms. They include, for instance, proximity to a market, the availability of an abundant multi-
functional work force, infrastructural network or public goods, aspects that are typical of widely populated 
areas (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; Harrison, Kelley, and Gant, 1997; Isard, 1956). In order to capture 
such an influence, we included a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the cooperatives are located in a 
large city, and zero in any other case.9 
In all, we have a sample of 9 variables belonging to 4,123 active cooperatives with a known regional 
localization. Since the cluster analysis gathers regions, we take each variable and calculate the regional 
average to construct a new sample that we use to carry out the clustering process (except for in the case of 
the NACE Rev.2 data, because it does not make sense to calculate the regional average). We have created 
three variables: NACE1, NACE2 and NACE3. In each region, the value of NACE1 is the number of NACE 
Rev.2 that gathers the highest percentage of cooperatives. NACE2 gathers the second-highest percentage, 
and NACE3 the third-highest. 
4. Results 
4.1. First objective: The relationship between the cooperatives’ employment and business cycles 
The results of the turning point analysis are presented in Appendix 2. On average, CE tends to be longer 
than the business cycle in contraction phases and shorter in expansion phases (Table A2.2). In Table 
A2.3, we can see that regarding GDP, CE leads in the peaks and is largely matching in the troughs. In 
addition, our results suggest that the amplitude of the GDP is greater than the CE, both in the contraction 
and in the expansion phases (Table A2.4). These outcomes do not differ from results presented by other 
scholars (Díaz and Marcuello, 2010; Román, 2014; Sala Rios, Farré Perdiguer, and Torres Solé, 2014; 
Sala Rios et al., 2015). 
We go further and investigate the relationship between business cycle and CRE. The features of the 
regional cycles indicate a noticeable regional diversity. In Table A2.2, we can see that the duration of the 
contraction phases ranges from 6 months (Castilla y León, La Rioja) to 21 months (Cantabria), and the 
duration of the expansion phases ranges from 5 months (Canarias) to 36 months (Asturias). The 
differences with respect to CE are more evident in the average lead/lag data (Table A2.3). We can see 
important lags both in the expansion and the contraction phases. The amplitude (Table A2.4) also shows 
important differences. However, as in the CE, the amplitude of the GDP expansion and contraction 
phases is greater than the CRE. From this result, it can be deduced that during upward episodes, the 
capacity of the economy to generate cooperatives’ employment is lower than its own capacity for growth. 
The opposite occurs in the contraction phases, where CRE results are better than that of GDP, which 
means that there exists a certain degree of resilience. 
Table 7 summarizes the synchronization information. The phases of the CE are quite well aligned with 
business cycle (the concordance index is around 68%), and the t-ratio is almost statistically significant 
(α=0.05). However, the regional synchronization indices show substantial differences. 
Regarding the t-student, the most noteworthy is on the one hand, that Aragón, C. Madrid, Navarra and La 
Rioja present counter-cyclical behaviour, although not statistically significant. On the other hand, the values 
of Andalucía, Canarias, Cantabria and Extremadura are significantly pro-cyclical. 
_____________ 
 
9  To determine which cities can be considered as large cities, we follow the Law of Large Cities or Law of Measures for the Modernization of 
Local Government (Law 57/2003, of December 16). 
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Table. 7. Synchronization indicators 




Concordance index (I) 
t-student 
Andalucía 0.37 0.69 2.161125 
Aragón 0.00 0.49 -0.072960 
Asturias 0.04 0.52 0.217122 
Baleares 0.09 0.52 0.249196 
Canarias 0.40 0.71 2.280997 
Cantabria 0.37 0.69 2.265295 
Castilla la Mancha 0.25 0.63 1.65972 
Castilla y León  0.13 0.57 0.801926 
Cataluña 0.29 0.63 1.479784 
C. Valencia 0.27 0.63 1.626022 
Extremadura 0.53 0.75 3.636126 
Galicia 0.32 0.66 1.866326 
C. Madrid -0.09 0.45 -0.641050 
C. Murcia 0.03 0.51 0.078614 
Navarra 0.01 0.49 -0.051135 
País Vasco 0.09 0.54 0.405286 
La Rioja  -0.15 0.42 -0.981203 
CE 0.34 0.68 1.904479 
Source: Own elaboration 
With respect the other two indices, Table 8 orders the regions mixing the K and the I intervals. 
Table. 8. Region’s position depending on K and I intervals 
       I   























M   Extremadura 
Source: Own elaboration 
We define: 
P(K)-F(I): low synchronization 
S(K)-F(I): medium-low synchronization 
S(K)- M(I): medium synchronization 
F(K)-M(I): medium synchronization 
F(K)-Su(I): medium-high synchronization 
M(K)-Su(I): high synchronization 
Based on this information, we define five regional groups: 
1. High-significant, pro-cyclical: Extremadura  
2. Medium-high significant, pro-cyclical: Andalucía, Canarias, Cantabria and CE 
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3. Medium-non-significant, pro-cyclical: Castilla y León, Asturias, Baleares, Murcia, País Vasco, Castilla la 
Mancha, Cataluña, C. Valencia and Galicia 
4. Medium-low-non-significant, counter-cyclical: Aragón, Navarra 
5. Low-non-significant, counter-cyclical: C. Madrid and La Rioja 
The second group, which gathers only three regions (18%), includes those whose relationship between 
their CRE and the business cycle is the most similar to that of CE. The analysis indicates that 23% of the 
regions show a high-medium-significant degree of synchronization, and around 53% reach a medium-non-
significant degree. We can also see that roughly 23% of them present a counter-cyclical relationship. These 
results confirm that cooperatives’ cycles demonstrate different relationships with respect to business cycles 
depending on the regional localization of cooperatives, but also that there is a prevailing medium-pro-
cyclical relationship. 
These results fit with the Díaz-Foncea and Marcuello (2015) study. These authors examine regional 
determinants that influence the rise of cooperatives and compare them with those that influence the capitalist 
companies. Although Pérotin (2006) indicates that there is not a great difference between the reasons for 
creating cooperatives and those for creating capitalist firms, Díaz-Foncea and Marcuello find important 
differences. With respect to the significant variables, the growth of GDP per capita and the wage level 
positively influence both capitalist firms and cooperatives. Instead, the unemployment rate presents an 
opposite effect. The rate has a positive sign on cooperatives (higher regional unemployment means higher 
creation of cooperatives and, therefore, cooperative employment) and a negative sign on capitalist firms 
(higher unemployment means lower creation of firms). Such outcomes could explain the cyclical behaviour 
that we have found in regions such as Extremadura, Andalucía, or Canarias. In these regions, the first two 
variables reach values that are close to, or not very different from, those of Spain as a whole. In contrast, 
their unemployment rate is high, both in the expansion and contraction phases – a fact that reduces the 
positive effect of its changes on the creation of cooperatives. 
On the other hand,  Díaz-Foncea and Marcuello (2015) find a positive and significant effect of a strong 
service and industrial sectors in a region on the creation of capitalist companies which is not observed in 
cooperatives. This would partly explain the counter-cyclical behaviour observed in some regions. Madrid 
presents a high weight of the cooperative service sector. Aragón, Navarra, and La Rioja show a higher 
weight of the cooperative industrial sector than that of Spanish economy (Table A1.3 in Appendix 1). Given 
that these variables are not determinants for cooperatives, in these regions cooperatives may expand more 
independently of the business cycle. Furthermore, the sales figures of Madrid and Aragón reach a relatively 
higher share over the number of cooperatives than in other regions (Table Al.1 in Appendix 1). We have 
already indicated the greater resilience of this variable to downturns. All of the above point to a greater 
decoupling regarding the business cycle. 
4.2. Second objective: the “cooperative culture”, the cooperatives’ cyclical phases and business cycle 
Next, we analyse the second goal of our study. Drawing upon the results of scholars who argue that the 
number of cooperatives in a region promotes better resilience (Arando, Peña, and Verheul, 2009; Díaz-
Foncea and Marcuello, 2014, 2015; Grávalos and Pomares, 2001; Smith, 2003), we ask: does the presence of 
a “cooperative culture” in a region mean higher decoupling regarding the business cycle? 
We assimilate “cooperative culture” with significant levels of cooperatives’ employment in the territory. 
The presence of “cooperative culture” is linked to the definition of agglomeration economies, in line with the 
work of Marshall (1890), which entail advantages such as the availability of specialized labour, the 
availability of intermediate goods and the ease of exchanging knowledge about products, processes and 
innovations10. Such advantages would allow greater cooperative resilience and strengthen the theory of 
higher decoupling. 
According to the rules mentioned in the methodology section, we plot an XY-graph, where in the x-axis 
represents the region-weight (Spanish economy = 1.16%, so 1.16 crosses the y-axis), and the cooperatives-




10  Agglomeration economies are usually divided into two groups: location economies and urbanization economies. The former is defined from the 
original vision of Marshall. The latter are associated with location externalities linked to urban areas (Pablo-Martí and Muñoz-Yebra, 2009). 
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Figure. 1. “Cooperative culture” according to region 
Source: Own elaboration 
Table 9 defines each quadrant. 
Table. 9. Grade of “cooperative culture” 
Quadrant Interpretation Grade of “cooperative 
culture” 
Upper-right  









Advantages in cooperatives- and 
disadvantages in region-weights 
Medium (MCC) 
Bottom-left  
Disadvantages both in region- and in 
cooperatives-weights 
Low (LCC) 
Source: Own elaboration 
We classify the regions in three levels (Table 10).  
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La Rioja  






Source: Own elaboration 
According to the literature, the “cooperative culture” would be linked to a decoupling with respect to the 
business cycle. However, comparing the current and the previous section results, we can see that the HCC 
regions, Andalucía, C. Valencia, País Vasco and Murcia, reach a considerable level of symmetry with 
respect to the business cycle, and it is even significant in the case of Andalucía. Furthermore, regions 
classified as MCC, such as Extremadura or Cataluña, reach pro-cyclical synchronization values that are not 
consistent with their “cooperative culture”. On the other hand, between the regions within the low level of 
“cooperative culture”, we can find Madrid and La Rioja, whose counter-cyclical relationship regarding the 
business cycle denotes a wide decoupling.11 
These results lead us to affirm that in the period of study, the presence of “cooperative culture” in a 
region did not mean higher decoupling regarding the business cycle. The localization economies (Marshall, 
1890) did not guarantee greater resilience of the employment in the face of recessions.  
We observe that the result agrees with Díaz-Foncea and Marcuello (2014), at least in the short term. 
Cooperatives’ employment is pro-cyclical in regions with high or medium cooperative development, while 
regions with low cooperative development do not show any significant relationship with total employment.  
4.3. Third objective: The 2008 crisis, patterns of surviving cooperatives and regional clusters 
As demonstrated by the phases of the business cycle (Table A2.1 in Appendix 2), the Spanish 2008 crisis 
lasted from Q4-2007 to Q1-2017, taking the “W” form. The Q2-2009 trough was followed by a peak in Q3-
2010, which yielded a new contraction that was much deeper than the previous one. In this sense, our 
calculations confirm this greater intensity – the amplitude of the first “V” (Q4-2007 to Q2-2009) is -123.1 – 
while the amplitude of the second “V”  (Q3-2010 to Q2-2013)  is -377.2. The study of Sala Rios et al. (2015) 
demonstrates that although cooperatives’ employment remained resilient during the first recession phase, it 
succumbed during second one. In the same vein, our estimations of the amplitude in the contraction phases 
show that in the second contraction phase (Q3-2010/Q2-2013), the amplitude of the cooperatives’ 
employment is the greatest, standing at -169.31. 
It is worth asking whether in the different Spanish regions, those cooperatives that survived the second 
contraction phase show common behaviour patterns. To undertake this third objective, we applied the cluster 
methodology to gather the most homogeneous regions depending on the values of the variables defined in 
the previous section. The analysis has been performed using the SPSS software. Agglomerative hierarchical 
cluster analysis, Euclidean squared distance and Ward’s clustering algorithm have been used as the 
clustering procedure. All variables have been standardized using a z-score. 
_____________ 
 
11  These results present some divergences from those found by Suárez and Torné (2018), especially relating to Andalucía, Navarra and País Vasco. 
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There are a number of methods to ascertain the appropriate number of clusters, but there is little 
consensus on which among them is most efficient. We use three approaches. The first is dendrogram 
evaluation. The second is the variance ratio criterion (VRC), introduced by Calinski and Harabasz (1974). 




where Bk is the overall between-cluster variation, and Sk the overall within-cluster variation with respect to 
all clustering variables. 




The main limitation of this index is that the number of clusters cannot be fewer than three. To resolve this 
limitation, as well as to give higher robustness to the solution of the dendogram and VRC index, we propose 
the third criterion based on a distinctive breaking point. We plot in the x-axis the different stage of the 
algorithm and in the y-axis the dendrogram rescaled distance. The cut-off point that helps to define the 
number of clusters is set where a sudden increase of the distance can be observed. 
The three criteria lead us to affirm that five is the appropriate number of clusters (see Appendix 3). The 
assignment of clusters is nine in cluster 1, five in the cluster 2 and 1 in the remainder of clusters. Roughly 
53% of the regions are sufficiently homogeneous to fall in the same cluster, and roughly 18% are not 
sufficiently homogeneous to be able to integrate them in the same cluster (Table 11). 
Table. 11. Cluster membership 
Region 5 clusters 
Andalucía, Asturias, Canarias, Cataluña, C. Valencia, Extremadura, 
Murcia, Navarra, País Vasco 
1 
Aragón, Castilla la Mancha, Castilla y León, Galicia, La Rioja 2 
Baleares 3 
Cantabria 4 
C. Madrid 5 
Source: SPSS and own elaboration 
Table 12 shows the mean values of the dependent variables for each group and the variance between 
groups/within-groups for each variable (F). With respect to the between/within variance, the highest rate 
corresponds to NACE1, followed by localization and debt ratio. The variability between groups remains 
significantly higher than within-group for NACE2, size and profit margin. Although the test must be 
interpreted with caution, it allows us to stress the relevance of these variables in the clustering process. 
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Table. 12. Mean values of dependent variables by cluster and variance by variable 
 Mean F Sig. 
         Cluster 
 
Variable 
1 2 3 4 5 Total   
Liquidity 2.895 4.778 4.432 1.525 1.930 3.402 3.100 0.057 
Debt 28.508 27.152 33.910 9.139 29.369 27.338 6.762 0.004 
Solvency 33.448 39.111 42.868 46.528 36.097 36.593 1.299 0.325 
Profit margin -2.222 -1.071 -19.893 -1.391 -0.937 -2.799 3.431 0.043 
NACE11 46 1 46 10 85  323.643 0.000 
NACE21 1 46 47 1 47  4.576 0.018 
NACE31 10 10 49 46 46  0.963 0.463 
Size 1.631 1.312 1.833 1.900 1.815 1.576 3.511 0.041 
Longevity 29.405 31.038 31.099 34.695 26.004 30.096 0.696 0.609 
Cooperative culture 1.889 2.600 3.000 3.000 3.000 2.294 1.695 0.215 
Localization 0.182 0.142 0.000 0.200 0.630 0.187 7.216 0.003 
1: The main activity in the cluster 
Source: SPSS and own elaboration 
The mean values indicate that cluster 1, the largest group, does not show extreme values. It only stands 
out because achieves the highest “cooperative culture” (lowest categorical variable). In general, their figures 
are lower than the total mean, except in the debt ratio and in the size. The economic activity of a large 
percentage of the cooperatives falls into the wholesale trade category (NACE Rev.2: 46), followed by crop 
and animal production (1) and manufacture of food products (10). 
The second cluster has the highest liquidity ratio. It brings together mature-micro cooperatives with a 
relatively low negative profit margin. Their activities are, as in cluster 1, focused on the wholesale trade 
category, crop and animal production and manufacture of food products. They are located in regions with 
medium-high “cooperative culture” and few urbanization economies. 
The rest of the clusters are idiosyncratic. Cluster 3, Baleares, is the most indebted, with the highest 
negative level of the profit margin. It is a region with low “cooperative culture” and null urbanization 
economies. Cantabria, cluster 4, shows the largest amount of extreme values. It has the lowest liquidity and 
debt ratio and the highest solvency. Overall, the region does not have “cooperative culture” but it has a 
medium level of urbanization economies. Their cooperatives are mature and small. Finally, cluster 5, C. 
Madrid, is not a “cooperative culture” region; however, it has important urbanization economies, and in fact, 
it has the highest level of these economies. Their cooperatives are the youngest and achieve the best profit 
margin, even though negative. It stands up in the education activities (NACE1=85), which is not found in 
any other region. 
We want to point out that while it is true that the results allow us to identify differences and define the 
most important strokes of each cluster, it is also true that the features analysed do not make the cooperatives 
very different among the regions. Overall, the cooperatives that survived were mature firms, micro-small 
sized12, not highly indebted, with elevated liquidity and solvency ratios and negative profit margins.13 Many 
of them were dedicated to service sector, although firms in the fields of crop and animal production and 
manufacture of food products also stand out. 
It could be possible that the negative profit margin that all the clusters exhibit could affect the short-term 
cooperatives’ survival ratio. The answer is negative. The percentage of cooperatives active in 2014 who 




12  This result should not come as a surprise, since, as in the rest of the Spanish productive structure, micro and small cooperatives prevail. In 2008, 
they gathered more than 90% (Sala-Ríos et al., 2018). 
13  Although there is no optimal value for financial ratios, since they depend on the company and the sector, there is a broad agreement that the 
following are adequate values: liquidity ratio (0.8-1); debt ratio (40% -60%); solvency ratio (33% -35%). 
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In this paper, we have studied the relationship between business cycle and cooperatives’ employment in 
Spain. The novelty inherent to our study is that we have done so at the regional level. We have also analysed 
whether the regions showed common features with respect to those cooperatives that survived the second 
contraction period within the 2008 crisis. 
The synchronization analysis indicates that the Spanish economy as a whole presents significant pro-
cyclical behaviour, which is not the case in a high percentage of regions. Regional differences regarding the 
relationship with the business cycle have been found. However, there is a predominant behaviour that 
indicates that more than 50% of the regions show a medium degree, although non-significant, of a pro-
cyclical relationship. At the same time, the results also suggest that only a small group of regions present a 
counter-cyclical relationship. 
It is worth noting that despite the scarce presence of regions with counter-cyclical movements, the results 
of the turning point analysis indicate that in the contraction phases, employment losses in cooperatives are 
lower than losses in eco-economic activity. Consequently, we can conclude that employment has a certain 
degree of resilience without being counter-cyclical. 
We also provide evidence that localization economies (in the Marshall sense) have not provided a 
counter-cyclical relationship. The presence of regional “cooperative culture” has not meant higher 
decoupling of the cooperatives’ employment regarding the business cycle. Therefore. “cooperative culture” 
has not guaranteed greater resilience of the cooperatives’ employment during recessions. 
In addition, we have also considered the crisis of 2008. Specifically, the second contraction phase within 
the crisis that took a “W” shape. We have investigated whether cooperatives that survived the second 
recession have common patterns that allow us to gather regions in homogeneous clusters. Our results 
indicate that there are three regions so idiosyncratic that it has been impossible cluster them with other 
regions. These are Baleares, Cantabria and C. Madrid. On the other hand, we have found that the clusters that 
gather more regions do not present extreme values, and in general, they are lower than the mean. It should be 
noted that the features analysed do not point to significant differences among regions. Therefore, the 
cooperatives that survived were mature firms, micro-small sized, not indebted, with elevated liquidity and 
solvency ratios and negative profit margins. The activities that stand out are the service sector, crop and 
animal production and manufacture of food products. 
Our results show that company age represents the experience and knowledge that allows older firms to 
perform better than newer firms (Arafat and Mohtar, 2014). The long-term continuous learning of the older 
cooperatives increases their possibilities to handle the financial structure and to survive. As we have 
highlighted, in the second onslaught of the crisis, longevity and adequate financial ratios were a guarantor of 
cooperative survival. However, as is deduced from the value of the amplitude in this phase, these factors 
were not a guarantor to preserve employment. 
It is often said that the socioeconomic role played by the cooperatives is not linked with better economic-
financial performance (Lauermann et al., 2018). In this sense, it is worth noting that all the clusters show a 
negative profit margin. This circumstance could affect the survival ratio, but we have calculated it in the 
short term, and it is not possible to support this assumption. However, when the data makes it possible, it will 
be interesting to investigate the extent to which this situation can hold in the long term. 
Relating to this negative margin profit ratio, is also worth noting that Marín-Sánchez (2016) states that 
Spanish legislation makes it possible that cooperatives treat their financial information in such a way that the 
tax benefits that result from an alternation between exercises with losses and exercises with profits were 
maximized. In this way, the increase of the cooperatives with losses during the recession that concerns us 
could be managed with accounting and fiscal mechanisms that would make the profits-losses alternation a 
viable and legal strategy. 
 The results of this paper can help policy makers to design measures of economic policies. There is no 
doubt that the policy makers should focus on promoting and stimulating cooperatives, because it would help 
to generate greater societal well-being and progress. According our outcomes, localization matters, and 
consequently, measures should be designed to improve the competitive position of cooperatives according to 
their geographical location. It is important to give relevance to the economies of localization as a way to 
promote positive externalities. On the other hand, we have pointed out that the losses in cooperatives’ 
employment are lower than that of the economic activity; however, the last crisis demonstrated that the 
cooperatives’ employment is not counter-cyclical. The policy makers should also promote the spatial 
interactions among cooperatives in order to face future downturn periods. 
We would like to emphasize that the major constraint of this study was insufficient official data. The lack 
of complete territorial and economic-financial information made it impossible to carry out part of the 
analysis with official statistics. In the last part of the study we had to use SABI, which is a widely accepted 
database with a significant amounts of information on various companies, but the reporting of information is 
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not homogeneous thorough the years, and there are many missing values. In this sense, in the cluster 
analysis, within the economic financial criteria, we thought that it was necessary to include the public aids to 
the cooperatives. However, this became impossible due to the large amount of lost values in the SABI 
database. 
Future inquiries should try to widen the study in two interlinked fields. First, it is necessary to include 
some variables that approach the public interventions in cooperatives. We have recommended that policy 
makers take into account the economies of localization in their measures. However, we have not analysed the 
extent to which such measures exist, even though they would be inefficient/insufficient, or alternatively, they 
do not yet exist. On the other hand, the regulation of cooperatives also warrants a larger analysis. Given that 
the regulations on cooperatives are very broad and in some cases have significant regional divergences 
(Marín-Sánchez, 2016), future analysis should explore whether such divergence influences cooperatives’ 
cyclical results and their survival rates. It would also be of interest to carry out a review of not only Spanish 
regulations, but also European regulations, in order to detect the degree of implementation of measures for 
development and verify if regulation has been a strength or weakness in periods of recession. 
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Appendix 1 
Table. A1.1. Cooperatives: main data 












Andalucía 5,888 8,863.12 1,109.05 54,335 4,684 9,879.11 1,164.09 49,850 
Aragón 746 1,399.70 146.86 6,491 639 1,698.08 150.86 5,175 
Asturias 333 539.95 58.39 3,218 299 642.91 65.58 2,975 
Baleares 158 339.94 43.37 2,175 170 322.71 45.98 2,405 
Canarias 472 1,267.31 123.76 6,490 356 1,161.53 118.53 5,425 
Cantabria 117 199.13 14.20 1,185 96 182.84 24.61 1,086 
Castilla  la 
Mancha 
1,386 2,011.68 256.13 10,970 1,218 2,070.54 250.75 9,576 
Castilla  León 1,385 2,373.31 278.23 9,751 1,376 2,460.87 279.65 9,083 
Cataluña 3,291 6,308.06 1,235.43 30,094 2,514 4,604.39 949.71 28,731 
C. Valencia 2,383 3,830.72 754.25 45,392 1,969 4,867.96 866.87 43,354 
Extremadura 821 1,717.70 152.97 6,524 747 1,798.01 170.91 5,216 
Galicia 898 2,388.97 228.62 7,093 824 2,634.03 220.74 6,651 
C. Madrid 1,100 5,193.91 351.00 12,101 981 4,408.52 361.78 13,293 
Murcia 1,351 2,374.88 337.61 15,152 1,111 2,728.04 361.89 14,422 
Navarra4 239 - - 3,986 230 - - 4,871 
País vasco4 955 - - 20,838 963 - - 20,070 
La Rioja 158 274.79 39.73 1,472 132 288.72 39.39 1,142 
Total 21,681 39,083.16 5,129.62 237,267 18,309 39,748.26 5,071.33 223,325 












Andalucía 3,992 11,832.88 1,111.89 46,162 4,855 10,191.70 1,128.34 50,116 
Aragón 568 1,969.71 159.50 4,712 651 1,689.16 152.41 5,459 
Asturias 233 587.24 52.13 2,190 288 590.03 58.70 2,794 
Baleares 161 304.16 46.06 1,373 163 322.27 45.14 1,984 
Canarias 291 1,086.13 105.66 4,470 373 1,171.66 115.98 5,462 
Cantabria 103 172.81 21.98 1,081 105 184.93 20.26 1,117 
Castilla la 
Mancha 
1,052 2,328.32 237.51 9,294 1,219 2,136.85 248.13 9,947 
Castilla y León 1,282 2,802.04 254.95 7,439 1,348 2,545.41 270.94 8,758 
Cataluña 2,166 4,566.82 1,037.20 28,484 2,657 5,159.76 1,074.11 29,103 
C. Valencia 1,674 5,034.93 997.66 39,512 2,009 4,577.87 872.92 42,753 
Extremadura 704 1,886.16 151.63 4,946 757 1,800.63 158.50 5,562 
Galicia 824 2,478.95 222.13 6,942 849 2,500.65 223.83 6,895 
C. Madrid 890 4,685.42 452.01 12,674 990 4,762.62 388.26 12,689 
Murcia 1,010 2,642.42 356.24 14,185 1,157 2,581.78 351.92 14,586 
Navarra4 264 - - 5,474 244 - - 4,777 
País vasco4 1,208 - - 23,081 1,042 - - 21,330 
La Rioja 124 281.67 31.56 1,246 138 281.73 36.89 1,287 
Total 16,546 42,659.67 5,238.11 213,265 18,845 40,497.03 5,146.35 224,619 
1.  Number of quotation centres   2. Thousand million euros   3. Number of employees 4. The fiscal data of País Vasco and Navarra are excluded 
because they have a special regional regime that allows them to have an independent Spanish Tax Agency; therefore, it is not possible to obtain their 
fiscal figures. 
Source: Ministry Labour and Social Economy (MLSE) and own elaboration. 
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Table. A1.2. Percentage weight of each region over Spanish total1 
Region 
















Andalucía 31.98 27.51 28.86 23.10 29.07 23.13 28.81 20.17 
Aragón 2.99 3.68 3.50 3.48 1.11 2.93 3.09 2.59 
Asturias 1.21 1.51 0.78 1.74 0.50 1.06 0.68 1.49 
Baleares 0.38 0.25 0.38 1.28 0.11 0.23 0.38 1.24 
Canarias 1.66 1.10 1.03 2.53 1.24 2.16 1.21 2.84 
Cantabria 0.22 0.38 0.38 0.73 0.04 0.50 0.46 0.61 
Castilla la Mancha 7.84 11.89 6.45 4.19 4.45 8.82 6.36 3.35 
Castilla León 21.26 6.36 3.67 4.54 4.31 7.19 3.42 3.11 
Cataluña 4.60 12.52 17.54 16.43 2.63 11.69 14.53 15.56 
C. Valencia 9.42 8.70 10.21 11.73 35.92 6.93 9.45 18.28 
Extremadura 4.06 5.04 3.31 3.76 1.99 3.77 5.24 2.15 
Galicia 5.30 4.21 2.34 4.77 2.35 5.43 3.56 2.69 
C. Madrid 0.73 2.34 4.22 7.58 0.49 1.94 3.71 7.78 
Murcia 5.32 3.84 10.75 6.41 13.93 4.05 11.55 4.99 
Navarra 1.55 1.50 0.57 1.28 1.36 5.02 0.43 1.77 
País vasco 1.16 7.63 5.61 5.84 0.46 13.84 6.87 10.82 
La Rioja 0.32 1.52 0.40 0.61 0.05 1.29 0.25 0.56 
1. 2005-2009-2014 average 
2. Number of quotation centres 
Source: Ministry Labour and Social Economy (MLSE) and own elaboration. 
Table. A1.3. Percentage weight of each sector over total of each region1 
Region 
















Andalucía 17.25 21.59 10.42 50.74 20.22 15.00 4.98 59.81 
Aragón 12.03 21.56 9.42 56.99 7.10 17.43 4.90 70.57 
Asturias 10.98 20.00 4.74 64.28 6.23 12.35 2.12 79.30 
Baleares 6.13 5.93 4.09 83.84 1.92 3.83 1.66 92.59 
Canarias 11.62 11.26 4.83 72.30 7.89 12.85 1.92 77.34 
Cantabria 5.38 13.92 6.33 74.37 1.19 14.62 3.55 80.64 
Castilla  la Mancha 16.85 37.20 9.27 36.68 15.58 28.82 5.54 50.06 
Castilla  León 41.31 17.98 4.77 35.94 17.15 26.66 3.38 52.80 
Cataluña 4.53 17.97 11.57 65.94 3.15 13.05 4.32 79.47 
C. Valencia 12.28 16.51 8.91 62.30 29.28 5.27 1.92 63.53 
Extremadura 14.04 25.35 7.66 52.95 12.50 22.01 8.17 57.33 
Galicia 16.34 18.89 4.83 59.94 11.90 25.58 4.48 58.04 
C. Madrid 1.92 9.02 7.47 81.59 1.34 4.98 2.53 91.15 
Murcia 12.04 12.64 16.27 59.04 33.28 9.03 6.86 50.84 
Navarra 16.64 23.47 4.09 55.80 9.92 34.14 0.78 55.16 
País Vasco 2.91 27.90 9.44 59.76 0.75 21.08 2.79 75.38 
La Rioja 6.04 42.03 5.07 46.86 1.40 32.69 1.68 64.22 
Total 13.89 20.22 9.30 56.59 15.52 14.46 3.86 66.16 
1. 2005-2009-2014 average 
2. Number of quotation centres 
Source: Ministry Labour and Social Economy (MLSE) and own elaboration. 
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Table. A2.1. Turning points: leads and lags with respect to the reference series (GDP) 
   Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak 
Reference Series (GDP)  Q3-2004 Q4-2007 Q2-2009 Q3-2010 Q2-2013 Q1-2017 
Andalucía - 0 0 +1 +4 - 
Aragón -3 -10 +2 +11 +6 +1 
Asturias - -8 -4 - - +1 
Baleares +9 - +7 -5 +3 +1 
Canarias - -4 0 0 0 - 
Cantabria - +3 - - +2 -3 
Castilla la Mancha -3 +2 - - -6 - 
Castilla y León  +5 +2 +2 - - - 
Cataluña +1 -2 0 -1 -2 -12 
C. Valencia +2 -5 - - +3 -2 
Extremadura +1 +1 +2 +2 -2 -8 
Galicia -3 - - -2 +4 -7 
C. Madrid -2 +3 +7 - - - 
C. Murcia -1 -7 +8 +10 +4 - 
Navarra +6 +2 +3 +7 - - 
País Vasco +2 -1 -1 +4 -11 - 
La Rioja  +1 -6 -6 - +10 -11 
CE - -5 0 0 -1 - 
Note: + (-) denotes a lag (lead) with respect to the reference series 
Source: BUSY and own elaboration 
Table. A2.2. Phases and cycles average duration (months) 
 
Contraction Peak to Peak Expansion Trough to Trough 
Reference Series 8.50 18.00 11.00 17.00 
Andalucía 10.0 12.00 6.00 20.00 
Aragón 12.00 23.50 10.00 21.50 
Asturias 10.00 46.00 36.00 - 
Baleares 6.33 15.50 9.33 15.00 
Canarias 10.50 15.00 5.00 16.00 
Cantabria 21.00 31.00 10.00 - 
Castilla la Mancha 14.00 - 18.00 32.00 
Castilla y León  6.00 - 10.00 16.00 
Cataluña 7.50 13.33 6.33 14.00 
C. Valencia 14.00 25.50 8.00 25.50 
Extremadura 7.00 13.50 9.00 15.50 
Galicia 17.00 21.00 14.50 42.00 
C. Madrid 9.50 21.00 14.50 23.50 
C. Murcia 13.00 28.00 7.00 19.50 
Navarra 7.00 16.00 9.00 16.00 
País Vasco 10.00 15.50 10.00 21.50 
La Rioja  6.00 32.00 16.00 21.50 
CE 10.50 16.00 5.00 15.00 
Source: BUSY and own elaboration 
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Table. A2.3. Turning point sequences with respect to the reference series 
 Average Lag Median Lag 
 Region Peaks Troughs All Peaks Troughs All  
Andalucía 0.50 2.00 1.25 0.50 2.00 0.50 
Aragón 0.67 1.67 1.17 -4.50 -0.50 1.50 
Asturias -3.50 -4.00 -3.67 -3.50 -4.00 -6.00 
Baleares -2.00 6.33 3.00 -2.00 5.00 2.00 
Canarias -2.00 0.00 -1.00 -2.00 0.00 0.00 
Cantabria 0.00 2.00 0.67 0.00 2.00 -0.50 
Castilla la Mancha 2.00 -4.50 -2.33 2.00 -4.50 -4.50 
Castilla y León  2.00 3.50 3.00 2.00 3.50 2.00 
Cataluña -5.00 -0.33 -2.67 -7.00 -1.00 -1.50 
C. Valencia -3.50 2.50 -0.50 -3.50 2.50 0.00 
Extremadura -1.67 0.33 -0.67 -3.50 -0.50 1.00 
Galicia -4.50 0.50 -2.00 -4.50 0.50 -2.50 
C. Madrid 3.00 2.50 2.67 3.00 2.50 0.50 
C. Murcia 1.50 3.67 2.80 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Navarra 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 
País Vasco 1.50 4.00 3.00 1.50 0.50 0.50 
La Rioja  -8.50 1.67 -2.40 -8.50 -2.50 -6.00 
CE -2.50 -0.50 -1.50 -2.50 -0.50 -0.50 
Note: +(-) denotes a lag (lead) with respect to the reference series 
Source: BUSY and own elaboration 
Table. A2.4. Phases average amplitude 
 Contraction Expansion 
Reference Series -321,55 241,03 
Andalucía -276,08 178,80 
Aragón -226,81 186,23 
Asturias -177,31 125,68 
Baleares -50,35 61,46 
Canarias -299,89 45,03 
Cantabria -146,52 245,36 
Castilla la Mancha -80,05 82,71 
Castilla y León  -316,80 199,79 
Cataluña -110,54 178,01 
C. Valencia -67,71 74,11 
Extremadura -128,26 3,81 
Galicia -6,40 69,26 
C. Madrid -100,01 271,08 
C. Murcia -20,79 48,58 
Navarra -149,81 132,94 
País Vasco -56,60 481,48 
La Rioja  -431,45 147,74 
CE -86,56 92,78 
Source: BUSY and own elaboration 




Figure. A2.1. Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between groups) 
(Rescaled distance Cluster Combine) 
Source: SPSS and own elaboration 
Table. A3.1. Agglomeration Schedule 
Stage Cluster combined 
Coefficients 
Stage cluster first appears Next 
stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 9 15 3,827 0 0 5 
2 1 11 5,078 0 0 5 
3 14 16 6,342 0 0 8 
4 7 8 7,189 0 0 6 
5 1 9 8,609 2 1 10 
6 2 7 8,691 0 4 7 
7 2 12 10,716 6 0 9 
8 10 14 13,175 0 3 11 
9 2 17 14,974 7 0 13 
10 1 3 16,169 5 0 11 
11 1 10 17,678 10 8 12 
12 1 5 18,981 11 0 13 
13 1 2 20,881 12 9 14 
14 1 4 28,186 13 0 15 
15 1 6 30,592 14 0 16 
16 1 13 32,782 15 0 0 
Source: SPSS and own elaboration 
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Table. A3.2. Variance Ratio Criterion (VCR) 
Number of clusters VCR k 
2 37,146  
3 35,105 1,929 
4 34,992 322,012 
5 356,891 -410,615 
6 268,176 44,083 
7 223,544 20,717 
8 199,629 1,929 
Source: SPSS and own elaboration 
Figure. A3.1. Rescaled distance evolution 
 
Source: SPSS and own elaboration 
 
